The economics literature extensively focused on pricing and openness as key strategic choices of platforms in two-sided markets, with the ultimate goal to obtain network effects and win over direct competitors within the boundaries of a single market. We argue that, due to the business model innovations, such as platform envelopment, the platform competition today grows beyond the boundaries of a single market. Our study argues that platform competition unfolds in two distinct, though interdependent stages. At first, platform owners make business model choices aimed at enhancement of user experience within a single market. At the second stage, platforms expand from their core by enveloping into neighboring platform markets, seeking to further enhance user-experience through cross-platform complementarities. Parallel envelopments form competing platforms will lead to convergence of neighboring markets and emergence of ?supra-platform market?, where diverse platform players co-habitate: compete, collaborate and engage in business model innovation.
market, while little attention is paid to the potential competition emerging from rival platforms in neighboring markets. As the example above on "the Gang of Four"
shows (Fast Company, 2011) , markets that hosted these four companies are becoming increasingly interdependent, with a tendency of blurring market boundaries and convergence to a single, encompassing competitive arena. Current theory on platform leadership, by missing the underlying dynamics that lead to this phenomenon, fails to predict platform markets evolution, competition and leadership in this emerging arena.
In this study we attempt to unfold these dynamics by conceptually exploring the value creation and also value capture logics of platform strategies. This, in turn, allows us to explicate emerging interdependence among the neighboring platform markets. Our work builds on the recent efforts to understand the strategies and business models in the platform markets that span more than one market. Eisenmann et al. (2011) advance that a platform leader in a core market may generate more value for its users by incorporating the functions of a smaller platform in adjacent markets, a strategy they call "envelopment". In essence, the platform that bundles the functions of two separated, complementary platforms will achieve efficiency and be more valuable to users. The classical example of this phenomenon is Microsoft's Windows operating system that has, over the years, incorporated functions performed by independent smaller platforms like Netscape (for the web explorer service) or Real ! ! $! Player (for the management of media files). Envelopment can be seen as a special case of a bundling strategy, where the value creation is explained by direct increase in customer utility through bundling of two complementary functions. However, it requires consideration of possible competitive feedback, such as competitive retaliation by other platforms. We draw from multi-market contact theory (e.g., Chen, 1996; Gimeno, 1999; Smith, Ferrier, & Ndofor, 2001 ) and insights from the literature on two-sided platforms to extend our knowledge on the competitive implications of envelopment.
We argue that 1) envelopment of platforms into neighboring markets that host a platform of a similar size would trigger envelopment response by rival platforms in those markets, which may lead to fierce cross-market competition; 2) cross-market competition would eventually escalate to evolve into market convergence, and the creation of what we refer to as 'supra-platform market'. We reason that as neighboring platforms expand their core functionality by entering into adjacent markets, parallel envelopment by platforms based in these adjacent markets -whether due to realization of the same opportunity or retaliation or both-may provoke a convergence of underlying, ex-ante separate markets, thereby redefining the boundaries of the platform markets. As this amalgam of markets supersedes the individual markets, competition and value creation-value capture logics shift from the core market to the supra-platform market level, characterized by increased diversity of competitors and the nature of the competition. According to this line of thought, platform market strategies, such as envelopment, should not be considered as unconditionally positive for the firm, even when -observed in isolation-they create superior value for the customer. While envelopment may offer superior value creating potential, it may involve creation of new competitive dynamics such as rival ! ! %! retaliation, which may in part limit or even erode the value capture not only from this move but also over the platform as a whole.
Our study adds to the literature on platform leadership by complementing the value creation logic with the logic of value capture that results from competitive feedback that platform strategies elicit from the market. We thus better qualify the process of envelopment by looking not only at the value of a single platform in isolation (which increases with envelopment) but also at the aggregate, ensuing dynamics of platform market(s) competition, which may enhance or cut down such value. More generally, main implication ensuing from our perspective is that more competitive platforms are those that strike a better balance between value creation and value capture logics and make their strategic choices regarding cross-platform market entry in consideration of the sustainability of their competitive advantage in the resulting supra platform market. In short, platforms may disrupt the market and gain leadership by devising business models for positioning in the envisioned supraplatform market.
PLATFORM STRATEGIES AND PLATFORM MARKET COMPETITION
The economic peculiarity of platform markets: the indirect network effects
Platform firms represent intermediaries between the users and service providers in the markets characterized with the indirect network effects (Eisenmann, et al., 2006; Evans, & Schmalensee, 2007; Rochet, & Tirole, 2003) . Network effects are demand-side economies of scale: the value of platform affiliation for any given affiliate depends upon the number of other affiliates (Economides, 1996; Eisenmann et al., 2011 , Farrell, & Saloner, 1985 Katz, & Shapiro, 1985) . While direct network effects are present when the value of a network (and hence the platform) increases
with the number of network users, such as in the case of the fixed line telephone (Katz, & Shapiro, 1994) , indirect network effects appear when the value that customer on one side of the platform realizes increases with the value that the customer on the other side of the platform realizes (Caillaud, & Jullien, 2003; Rochet, & Tirole, 2006; Rysman, 2009) . The interconnectedness of the value creation function of the two customer groups leads to economic peculiarity of the platform markets:
interrelationship between the elasticity of demand of the two groups: final users on one side, and providers of complementary content on the other side. Platforms like Google's web browser or Apple's iPhone operating system, serve users and providers by intermediating the different needs for economic transactions these groups have.
Users consume the services of the platform and its affiliated, complementary products, and providers who use the platform as the intermediary to build and sell or promote their products and services to the end users. Examples of two-sided platforms include videogame consoles, operating systems, shopping malls, and credit cards among others (Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2000 , 2005 Rochet, & Tirole, 2003) .
A platform's success thus, largely depends on the number of customers on both sides. Beyond the relationship that exists between the economies of scale and scope and performance in regular companies (Panzar, & Willig, 1981; Teece 1980 Teece , 1982 , in the platform markets this relationship is further accentuated by the valuegenerating loop between users and providers, leading to indirect network effects (Rysman, 2009 ). More specifically, the platform's value to the providers largely depends on the platform's installed base of users whom they can offer the products to, while the value of the platform to the users depends largely on the variety of products and services offered by the providers (Rochet, & Tirole, 2006; Roson, 2005) . Value ! ! '! of the platform grows as the platform matches demand from both sides (Evans, 2003) ; henceforth, the name of two-sided markets.
The literature has established that the presence of the indirect network effects in the market should lead to the acceleration of the competition between the platform companies operating in the same market (Rysman, 2009 ). Fierce competition is expected to lead to the 'winner takes it all' situation where one company acquires dominant position in the market and uses the sheer scale of its customer base to ward off new entrants. This is particularly true when, besides the strong network effects, the market is characterized by high switching costs that prevent multi-homing (single user's affiliation to multiple platforms simultaneously) and hence shelter incumbents from competition (Farrell, & Saloner, 1985; Katz, & Shapiro, 1985; Klemperer, 1987) .
The literature argues that to overcome entry barriers, aspiring platform providers generally must offer revolutionary functionality (Henderson, & Clark, 1990; Bresnahan, 1999) and disrupt the existing platform. For these reasons, Evans and Schmalensee (2001) observed that platform markets often evolve through sequential winner-take-all battles, where eventually superior new platforms replace old ones (Eisenmann et al., 2011) .
Specific strategies of the platform companies: the value creation perspective
Platform companies have been recognized to have strategies that are peculiar to the economic conditions of the platform markets. These strategies are mainly targeted at leveraging network effects, thus expanding users base, and stimulating variety of complementary products on the providers side. One of the most prominent strategic choices of platform owners encompasses decisions on pricing (Caillaud, & Jullien, 2003; Eisenmann et al., 2006; Hagiu, 2005 Hagiu, , 2009 Rochet, & Tirole, 2006) .
The main premise to the pricing strategy is that due to the value loop between the size of the user and provider base, price setting on one side of the market depends not only on the demand elasticity of the customers of that side of the market, but also on the demand elasticity of the customers on the other side of the market (Rysman, 2009 ).
Thus, the decision to set the price to one side, say users, would not only encompass considerations of the price elasticity of the users, but also the value that the size of the user base will provide to the providers, thereby decreasing their price elasticity (Rysman, 2009 (Rysman, , 2006 Weyl, 2009 ). The increased value for the providers and subsequent decrease in price elasticity may allow for the prices to the users to even be optimally set below the marginal costs or become even negative. The value created to the providers by the increase in user base will indeed subsidize the low prices for the users.
Another important market strategy concerns the platform openness (Boudreau, 2010; Eisenmann et al., 2008; Rysman, 2009) . While there is an absence of complete consensus in the literature with respect to the definition, platform openness refers to how a platform relates to the competing platforms and to providers of complementary products; whether it seeks incompatibility, compatibility, or some type of integration (Rysman, 2009 (Eisenmann et al., 2011) . Platform envelopment entails entry by one platform provider into another' s market by bundling its own platform' s functionality with that of the target, so as to leverage shared user relationships and common components. According to Eisenmann et al. (2011) , envelopment emerges when a platform incumbent in one market sees complementarities between his platform and the platform in an adjacent market that is typically owned by a smaller firm. To snatch that opportunity, larger platform owner integrates the smaller platform's functionalities into its core one, thus providing combined value. Platform envelopment could be thus conceived as a unique form of product bundling, where the individual products are platform functions. If the two platforms functions are super-additional or super-modular (Milgrom, & Roberts, 1995) , the joint value of the "bundled platforms" (the value of the platform after envelopment) is larger than the sum of the value of individual platforms and envelopment makes economic sense from the perspective of value generation for users. For example, Google has entered ! ! *! many platform markets by linking new products to its search platform, including online payment services (Google Checkout), productivity software (Google Docs), Web browser software (Chrome), and mobile phone operating systems (Android).
Competitive implications of the platform strategies: the value-capture perspective
Most of these platform strategies however, prove to be a subject to the competitive responses from other platforms. While the use of aggressive pricing is effective from the perspective of a single platform owner, thanks to the value created to the one side of the network, usually users, it makes the competition in the market much more pronounced as it triggers retaliation by the rivals. The increase in competition, in turn stimulates more aggressive pricing strategies, such as the pricing discrimination in favor of particular users that have power inside the user community.
For example, video game console makers have given the largest game manufacturer advantageous contracts in order to attract games to their consoles (Eisenmann et al., 2006) .
Openness decisions have relevant implications on the competitiveness as well.
Providers of platforms can stimulate incompatibility with competing platforms, in order to lock in current customers and locks out competitors. For instance, the video game market has been poised with incompatibility of video games across different video gaming consoles. To a certain extent, this has been offset by publishers' relatively low marginal costs of reproducing the games in formats suitable for different platforms. When service providers seek to offset incompatibility, platforms may look to strengthen it by encouraging exclusive membership or usage. For example, game console manufacturers may contract with developers to write exclusive games (Corts, & Lederman, 2009; Lee, 2010) . Typically, if one side of the ! ! "+! market can be made exclusive, the platform can charge higher prices to the other side (Rysman, 2009 ).
PLATFORM COMPETITION REVISITED. SUPRA-PLATFORM MARKETS
Eisenmann clearly demonstrates that the creation of value for the users through bundling functionalities across platform markets is the main motivating factor for the envelopment strategy. While this value creation argument is strong, it is not sufficient. The considerations of the competitive repercussions -a crucial factor for value capture (e.g., Chen, 1996) -are absent, while may be outstanding in the context of neighboring markets that host platforms of similar sizes. As extant literature on the platform market already demonstrates, within the same market, every move by a platform provider results not only in the main value creating effect, but also in the secondary feedback effect through the competitive replies of the rivals. For example, deep discounts in the platform pricing strategy are likely to result in retaliative discounts from the rival. Efforts to limit openness, such as exclusive membership and points in the payment cards market, will be met by similar strategies from the rivals (Rysman, 2009 ).
Indeed, envelopment, strictly speaking, encompasses the expansion of a platform's functionality that would be considered central to the offering of a smaller platform operating in the neighboring markets. In this particular context, the implicit assumption is that the larger platform would overshadow the smaller platform in terms of the user base and therefore be able to offer preferential prices, such as offering the additional functionality for free, in order to attract customers of the smaller platform to migrate to their platform. The competitive aftermath in this
context is for the platform enveloper to overtake the neighboring market while also strengthening its presence on her home market, thanks to superior, bundled, offering.
Given that the value creation logic of the platform envelopment extends beyond the specific context of larger firm enveloping into the market of a smaller firm, one may wonder about the competitive implications in the context where two equally sized platform firms from neighboring markets find themselves in the position to create superior customer value through foray into each other's market. Or in a case where a platform in the neighboring market contemplates retaliation against the platform that envelops into its market. As this would imply competition across the market boundaries and it is harder to implicitly assume victory of any one of the neighboring platforms on the basis of the size of their customer base, prediction of the sequential winner-takes-all competitive dynamics within the single markets is unlikely to hold. Instead, it would be necessary to understand the nature of the cross-market competition.
Multimarket contact (MMC) theory (e.g., Chen, 1996; Chen, & MacMillan, 1992; Gimeno, 1999; Gimeno, & Woo 1999; Fuentelsaz, & Gomez 2006; Smith et al., 2001) suggests that firms' competitive behavior may be constrained by the higher interdependence between rivals derived from their mutual contacts in overlapping markets. As innovation leaders keep entering new segments or markets, the level of multiple contacts with their rivals will likely increase and rivalry may escalate; a contingency that may well offset the benefits of economies of scope derived from related diversification. Literature on multi-market contact looks at competition and firm performance as a function of actions-reactions of firms, which in turn depend on (more or less symmetric) resource endowment of rivals as well as their market positioning. Smith et al. (2001) reviewing the field come to conclude that (1) firm ! ! "#! level characteristics are related to action; (2) a clear relationship exists between action and reaction, with resources be the main determinant of the ability to respond; (3) industry structure influences the dynamic process, with barriers to entry playing a moderating role on the frequency of action-reaction; and (4) performance is related to action-reaction, being it greater the faster a firm act and the more it can delay reaction.
All this is not accounted for by studies on platform leadership, particularly by those looking at envelopment strategy, which implicitly assume that envelopment and size would enable the focal platform to mute reaction (hence competition) from enveloped platforms of adjacent markets.
However, applying the logic of multi-market contact theory to the context of platforms, one might expect that platforms acting on neighbouring markets may react to an envelopment attack by in turn performing envelopment themselves; this would imply that the two neighbouring platforms would enter into each others' "home" markets, which would de facto establish multi-market contacts. Preparation for the envelopment could also be seen a pre-emptive 'weapon' to fire back (or react quickly to rival platforms) should they face an envelopment attack from platforms acting in these markets. In other words, platforms may undertake envelopment and add layers to their core functionality as a way to build capacity to forbear tough competition in their 'home' market by enveloping platforms coming from neighbouring markets. As Jayachandran, Gimeno, & Varadarajan, (1999:60) advance in their theoretical analysis of MMC theory, "before mutual forbearance takes effect, firms may extend their product lines and enter different markets". Since competition may well be an outcome of, and tougher under MMC (Chen, 1996) , firms may decide to invest heavily in R&D and product innovation in order to quickly respond (introduce new product) to a rival's attack. Hence, platform envelopment may be conceived as both a ! ! "$! function of innovation capability of the platform firm in response to a value proposition for consumers, and multimarket competition in response to actual or anticipated rivals' moves.
Parallel envelopments
Given that the increase in customer utility through bundling of the two functionalities may be seen as a sufficient value creating condition to envelop, we argue that all platforms in the neighboring markets may see a potential value in enveloping. Recent press abounds with the examples of this parallel envelopments phenomenon (Economist, 2012) .
At first, a platform company looks to establish itself in its 'home' market.
While quest for the indirect network effects through pricing and openness seems to be crucial at that stage, the "get-big-fast" strategy needs to be fundamentally based on the superior functionality and customer experience, for a platform to emerge as the winner in its home market (e.g., Cennamo, & Santaló, 2013; Gawer, 2010) . For example, Facebook gained network effects through attracting mutually interesting social groups (college students of top US schools), while at the same time, working hard on the user interface and even postponing the advertising (i.e., the revenue side) in order to get the users 'buy in'. Its rival Friendster managed to develop a large user base but failed in delivering good user experience due to the interruption in service, ceding the market to Facebook. Even pricing and openness, that have been primarily considered as strategies to obtain larger customer base and, hence, a tool to stimulate indirect network effects, have sometimes relied on the increase in customer utility to do so. Examples such as subsidized prices or openness are helpful in illustrating this point. After establishing itself in its home market, whether that was access to content Given that the increased customer utility seems to be a principal motivating factor for the strategic choices and that envelopment achieves that through the superadditive or super-modular (complementary) functionalities (Eisenmann et al., 2011) , one may expect that if one platform recognizes the envelopment opportunity in the neighboring market so will the platform based in this neighboring market. This would be particularly true if the platforms are of similar size or have capabilities to strike back (Chen, 1996; Smith et al., 2001) , and none of the two neighbor platforms has a clear size advantage over the other. While one may argue that platforms may be hesitant to enter each other's markets, due to the threat of retaliation by the neighbors, this will is unlikely because of two reasons. First, to make the threat of retaliation credible, a platform needs to first gain foothold into neighboring market (thus undertake substantial envelopment preparations), which will provide them with the possibility to react to aggressive competitive moves of enveloping platforms (e.g., Fuentelsaz, & Gomez, 2006; Gimeno, 1999; Jayachandran et al., 1999) . Second, because of the dynamics related to the indirect network effects that characterize platform markets, building and activating the ecosystem of users and providers takes time and great effort. Platforms cannot afford the luxury of 'wait-and-see' how envelopment evolves before taking definitive action. By the time envelopment plays out, it might be too late for enveloped platforms to react. Extant research on the platform markets has showed that due to the indirect network effects, firms will be ! ! "&! more prone to escalate competition for the sake of enhancing customer utility.
Practices, such as pricing below costs and complete openness are good indicators of this tendency. Furthermore, accelerated and spiraling nature of competition that leads to the sequential 'winner-takes-all' competitive end game emphasizes the importance of acting quickly in a 'race for the market'.
We advance therefore that the companies operating in the platform markets would be more likely to expose themselves to the proactive envelopment into the neighboring market that hosts a platform player of a similar size. Furthermore, in line with multi-market contact theory, envelopment move by a platform may also trigger retaliation due to the effectuated (or anticipated) envelopment move from a neighboring platform. This retaliative envelopment move may not to be directed into the core market of the attacking platform, but it may be in one of the "adjacent"
markets -markets where the platform-attacker has enveloped into or has plans to envelop into in foreseeable future.
Finally, it is worth noticing that retaliative envelopments in the adjacent market will have a knock-on effect not only on the attacking platform that is interested to envelop in the adjacent market, but also potentially on the third platform whose home is in that adjacent market. Anecdotal evidence from the platform market offers support for this logic. For example, starting from the media content interface such as iTunes, Apple has started making inroads for music-based social media, such We formalize the aforementioned arguments in the Proposition 1 and we provide the illustration for it in the Figure 1 below.
PROPOSITION 1: Platform envelopment of a company A into a neighboring market hosted by a company B, is likely to coincide or provoke the envelopment of the company B into the company A's home market or one of its adjacent markets. -----INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE -----

Market repercussions of parallel envelopments: The supra-platform market
Motivated by increased customer utility or competitive retaliation or both, platforms in neighboring markets are likely to start to envelop into each other's markets. This systemic envelopment over multiple markets is likely to lead to changes in the competitive landscape. For once, business models and competitive strategy of platforms will start to exceed the boundaries of a single market, as all players take into consideration neighboring markets for the purpose of their business model innovations and their competitive moves (Chen, 1996; Gimeno, 1999; Fuentelsaz, & Gomez, 2006) . Given this interconnectedness across the markets, in terms of the value creation functions and competitive strategies, one may question whether the competitive end game in a style of the sequential 'winner-takes-all' battles in individual market is still a likely scenario.
! ! "(!
In line with the multi-market contact theory, platforms may understand and anticipate the competitive setting they face, and decide to avoid unwelcome tough competition by engaging in tacit collusion by force of mutual forbearance, de facto recognizing each others' "spheres of influence" (Gimeno, 1999; Fuentelsaz, & Gomez, 2006) . In the classic markets, this is more likely when there is a higher the degree of firm similarity, in terms of resources/capabilities, and asymmetry in market positioning (firms being market leader in distinct markets; that is, having "spheres of influence"). However, and contrary to classical markets based on which multi-market contact theory has been developed, these neighbor platform markets will be highly interdependent not just because of the multiple contacts established by the enveloping platforms, but because of the reinforcing indirect network effects between users and providers, as documented by literature on two-sided markets.
Given that the indirect network effects are platform-based and encompass the whole platform, across the functionalities and market boundaries, the envelopment to the neighboring markets will reinforce indirect network effects around the entire platform, including both its core and the adjacent functionality. Thus, what were before separate markets will no longer be independent after participating firms engage into envelopments. This will, in turn, make it hard for platforms to "preserve" a home market versus neighboring ones, and build 'spheres of influences' as in the case of multi-market contact firms in classical markets. Because of this, we argue that envelopment dynamics will lead to the emergence of a new market that supersedes former separated markets, redefining the competitive landscape. We call it supra-
So, what does this imply for the resulting competitive dynamics? Firstly, as the increased functionality is likely to increase customer utility of the enveloping Indeed, due to increased customer utility, each enveloper would demonstrate higher value compared to non-envelopers (pure players) in the home market.
Observing this process in isolation, one may conclude that the envelopment would lead to the tipping of the market and 'winner takes it all' situation. Nevertheless, we cannot consider any longer that platform competition would unfold within welldefined market boundaries; the enveloping platform has to consider competition, such as retaliative envelopment in its core market, of the enveloper from the neighboring market where she enveloped (e.g. Google vs. Yahoo, Facebook vs. MySpace). Indeed, the two envelopers are now offering similar combined functionality, which may lead to some migrations of the users from one platform to another. This, in turn, would represent a sign of a direct competition between the two envelopers and the parallel envelopments across the boundaries of the neighboring platform markets would likely provoke the erosion of market boundaries between the two markets.
Nevertheless, neighboring platform may also consider enveloping in the market adjacent to the core platform market of the enveloping platform. While envelopment of two platforms to each other's core markets may lead to the development of similar value propositions that compete head-to-head for the same user base, the multi-platform envelopment is likely to result in the variety of different Parallel envelopments and the emergence of supra-platform market.
Initially, each of the four aforementioned companies has developed and operated a powerful business model in its own market. Google developed a superior search engine that appealed to the users for it simplicity and then tied it to advertising.
Facebook developed a social network platform that has been strategically rolled out to harvest the direct network effects within college communities and then coupled this Google's has struggled to develop a compelling alternative to both Amazon's digital fare and iTunes. In March 2012, though, Google brought together its offerings in music, ebooks and other areas as a part of a new online store, Google Play.
The nature and intensity of competition in the supra-platform market.
Unlike the competitive dynamics within their core markets in the 1997 -2003 period, Amazon, Apple, Google and Facebook are now finding themselves competing with rivals that have radically different business models (Economist, 2012) . Amazon is ! ! #$! selling its Kindle e-readers and tablet computers, which use a modified version of Android, at pretty much what it costs to produce and sell them; it seems that Amazon uses its tablets to sell everything else in the world, whereas Apple used iTunes to sell iPods. Google markets its Android-powered phones, which are produced by others and Google Nexus tablets, which are made by Asus and Samsung. In 2011, though, it acquired a handset-maker, Motorola Mobility. It has recently also begun selling cheap notebooks using not Android but another of its operating systems, Chrome.
Most analysts expect Google to churn out relatively cheap devices in the hope that buyers will use them to access its search and other services, thus seeing the ads on them (Economist, 2012) . In the opposite direction, regarding the difference of the two business models, Apple is powering its expensive devices with free, integrated services (clouding storage, voice-based search, maps and photo applications, and the like) that would make them more appealing, and increase the user experience.
The competition in this ICT supra-market is, of course, not exclusive to the The likelihood of the invasive envelopment may be a function of a value creation gained through envelopment, value capture lost due to competition, but also a value loss from lost collaborations. Here, it is instructive to remember that neighboring markets are neighboring through the virtue of their value chain proximity.
This means that there is a high likelihood that prior to the platform envelopment moves, there used to be some level of collaboration between neighboring market platforms, in order to ensure that the customer has higher utility (e.g. Apple was always hosting Google apps on their iOS systems). This collaboration gets into question when one platform envelops into the other's market and some platform players are particularly cautious about this. As Marc Zuckenberg, the CEO of Facebook suggests: 'Our goal is not to build a platform. It is to be across all of them... '. (Fast Company, 2011) As suggested, parallel envelopments over two or even more neighboring market would result in the emergence of the supra-platform market that would host companies with very diverse business models (Zott, & Amit, 2010; Teece, 2010) . To 
CONTRIBUTION AND CONCLUSION
In short, all platform strategies, including envelopment are composed of two strategic dimensions that may involve some tradeoffs: business model innovations and strategies, such as envelopment, which are aimed at value creation and an increase in the customer utility, and competitive implications of these strategies and competitive strategies themselves, that impact the value capture of the platform firm.
We argue that the interplay of the two will lead towards the parallel envelopment moves by the companies in the neighboring markets and that these parallel Besides direct contribution to the platform literature, our article speaks to two other lines of literature-business model literature and industry architecture literature.
Deploying the theoretical lens of business model, defined as a system of activities and/or transactions, is very useful to disentangle more complex set of strategic and
business model choices and objectives that platform owners need to balance with the objectives of the competitive strategy over time. We show that platform envelopment, which can be seen as a particular type of the business model innovation has an impact on the formation on the supra-platform markets. Nevertheless, this theoretical framework also shows how the business model proliferation and changes may be the consequence of the change in the market boundaries, particularly when the convergence of several platform markets puts firms with significantly different business models in the same competitive arena. It would be interesting for the future study to further disentangle the dynamics between the competitive strategies and business model innovation.
Our characterization of platform markets evolution (and its effects on value creation and capture) inform on the dynamic between the business model the platform envisions for the evolving ecosystem and the industry feedback, thus helping us understanding how platform moves may lead to disintegrating existing industries and redefining new industry architectures . The theory of industry architecture indeed explains that platforms enjoy higher bargaining power vis-à-vis their providers of complementary products that contribute to platform value generation because they hold the bottleneck assets within the industry value chain structure. In short, they control the architecture of the industry, hence they are able to capture large part of the value being generated therein. However, industry architecture literature does not explain how particular platform-centric industry architecture emerges and why some platforms more than others gain stronger control over the innovation in platform markers (e.g. linear planning process or 'fail forward' iterative experimentation)? All these questions seem to point to the fertile ground for academic enquiry. We hope that our paper inspires colleagues to engage in such efforts.
